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Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic
Liberties Should Not Be Just for the Rich
Erwin Chemerinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
When I was invited to participate in this symposium, I imme-
diately accepted without giving any thought to what I would write
on the topic of economic liberties. As the date for the symposium
approached, I became increasingly worried about what I would
say on the topic. I strongly believe that the Supreme Court has
gotten it right since 1937 when it comes to economic rights. The
Court has been clear that claims of economic rights should receive
only rational basis review.' Freedom of contract is not regarded as
a fundamental right.2 Government regulations are upheld so long
as there is some conceivable permissible purpose and so long as
the means are reasonably related to achieving the goal. The Court
has greatly deferred to government economic regulations; "the
Court has not invalidated an economic regulation on substantive
due process grounds since 1937."3
Since the famous United States v. Carolene Products Co. foot-
note,4 the Court has drawn a distinction between political rights
and economic liberties. The former-including the provisions of
the First Amendment and the protection of "discrete and insular
minorities"-receive heightened judicial scrutiny; but the latter is
treated with great judicial deference and receives rational basis
review. This is exactly right: the Court has made the correct value
choice in terms of the importance of the interests at stake and the
relative need for government regulations. There is a far greater
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Sci-
ence, University of Southern California. I want to thank Tatanya Litovsky for her excel-
lent research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 491 (1955) (uphold-
ing an Oklahoma law forbidding opticians from making eyeglass lenses without a prescrip-
tion); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37
(1949) (utilizing rational basis review to uphold state laws preventing employer discrimina-
tion against non-union workers).
2 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). This case marked the
end of the Lochner era. The Court stated: "What is this freedom? The Constitution does
not speak of freedom of contract." Id.
3 GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 733 (4th ed. 2001).
4 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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need for economic regulation in the complex economy of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, than for regulation of
speech or for discrimination against minorities. Political and civil
rights and liberties-free speech, privacy, voting, and so on-are
properly regarded as fundamental rights because of their impor-
tance to personhood and for society; but freedom of contract
should not be so regarded.
My belief that the Court has clearly gotten it right for the last
sixty-five years with regard to economic liberties created a chal-
lenge in choosing a topic for this symposium. Was it worthwhile
to write a paper defending a status quo that is so widely accepted
as correct?5
I initially began a paper doing just that-arguing that the
Court has taken the right approach to economic liberties since
1937. This felt strange; perhaps because I have spent the last
twenty-five years writing articles criticizing decisions, I am unac-
customed to writing articles praising them. So I searched for an
alternative topic and realized that the entire discussion of eco-
nomic liberties, at this symposium and through most of American
history, has been about protecting the rights of the rich to keep
and use their money and property. The phrase "economic liber-
ties" brings to mind challenges to regulations-minimum wage
laws, minimum hour laws, child labor laws-put in place to help
the more disadvantaged and powerless members of our society.
But if we are going to engage in a serious discourse about eco-
nomic liberties, then our focus should be on the rights of the least
well off in America. The wealth gap between the rich and the poor
has grown wider in recent years and is increasing. I truly believe
that in the long-term, the greatest threat to the survival of the
nation will come from the growing class divide. History shows
that the division between rich and poor is the most frequent impe-
tus for political uprisings. Moreover, it is immoral that the
wealthiest nation in the history of the world does so little for its
poor.
5 Listening to the other papers at this symposium reminded me that the agreement
is not universal. Hearing some of the leading advocates for a revival of economic rights
caused me to think that maybe a defense of the status quo might have been appropriate
after all. On the other hand, advocacy of a return to the Lochner era seems limited to a
relatively small group of libertarian and quite conservative scholars. There are no sugges-
tions from the Supreme Court that such a revival is likely to happen any time soon, and the
overwhelming weight of academic opinion is in favor of continuing the law as it has been for
the last sixty-five years. There also is a more subtle reason why even most conservative
law professors and judges do not urge a revival of the Lochner era doctrines: at least since
the Warren Court, conservatives have been the foremost advocates of judicial restraint.
Heightened judicial scrutiny of economic regulations, with frequent invalidations of fed-
eral, state, and local laws, would be impossible to reconcile with this philosophy of judicial
review.
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So I decided that the focus for this essay would be a simple
message: if there is going to be a rebirth of concern for economic
liberties, it should focus on creating and protecting rights for the
poor, not on safeguarding the wealth and property of the rich from
government regulation. In this essay, I make three points. First,
the traditional focus of the Supreme Court's economic liberties de-
cisions has been on protecting corporations and the wealthy from
government regulation. Second, the real problem when it comes
to economic liberties is poverty. Finally, in the long term, the
Court should interpret the Constitution as creating a right to min-
imum entitlements for all Americans to the necessities of life:
food, shelter, and medical care.
I, of course, am not the first to argue this; forceful arguments
for a constitutional right to livelihood have been made by eminent
scholars such as Charles Black, Peter Edelman, and Frank
Michelman.6 Nor do I have any illusion that this is likely to hap-
pen in my lifetime. No Justice on the current Court would advo-
cate such a view and it is as much a minority position in the
academy as is advocacy for a revival of Lochner era doctrines.
More generally, there is little social commitment to dealing with
the problem of poverty. For at least the last quarter of a century,
welfare reform has been all about cutting benefits and eligibility
with increasingly draconian laws. Intellectually, there has been a
growth in a libertarian philosophy which seems founded on
profound selfishness-a desire of people to have the government
leave them and their money alone. There has not been a develop-
ment of a social ethos of caring and duty to others.
Few seem to remember that President Richard Nixon pro-
posed a guaranteed annual income in the form of a negative in-
come tax. The War on Poverty of President Lyndon Johnson's
"Great Society" is a distant, and poorly understood, memory. But
I deeply believe that someday attention will turn again to the real
problem of economic rights: the plight of the poor. And someday,
as social attitudes change, the Supreme Court will say that every
person has a fundamental right to basic entitlements such as food,
shelter, and medical care. This essay is written in the hope and
anticipation of that time, undoubtedly far into the future.
II. THE TRADITIONAL Focus OF ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
In this section, I make a simple point: advocacy of economic
liberties in the Supreme Court has been about protecting the in-
6 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our
Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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terests of corporations and the wealthy to be free from govern-
ment regulation. Certainly, this was true during the Lochner era.
The landmark case of Lochner v. New York involved a challenge to
a state law that limited bakers to working sixty hours a week and
no more than ten hours a day.7 The law obviously was enacted to
protect bakers from being pressured into working inhumane and
unhealthy hours. The Court's invalidation of this statute was typ-
ical of what occurred throughout this era of American constitu-
tional history: the Supreme Court repeatedly invalidated statutes
that were enacted to help workers and consumers.
For example, in Adair v. United States,' and Coppage v. Kan-
sas,9 the Court declared unconstitutional federal and state laws
that prohibited employers from requiring employees to sign agree-
ments stating they would not join a union. In the early part of the
century, as workers attempted to unionize, many states and the
federal government adopted laws to facilitate unionization by
prohibiting employers from insisting, as a condition of employ-
ment, that employees agree not to join a union. The Supreme
Court declared the laws unconstitutional as impermissibly in-
fringing freedom of contract. The effect of these decisions was to
protect the rights of management to be free from unions and deny
workers the ability to unionize to equalize their bargaining power.
Similarly, the Court during this era repeatedly invalidated
state minimum wage laws which had been enacted to ensure that
workers were paid a humane, albeit small, amount1 ° Laws pro-
tecting consumers from abuses by businesses were also struck
down. For instance, in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., the Court de-
clared unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use of "shoddy"
in making bedding. 1 The Court rejected the claim that the ban
was needed to protect public health and found that the law inter-
fered with freedom of contract for anyone who wished to buy and
sell such products. 2 The Court said that the public interest in
health could be served by regulation, such as by mandating sterili-
zation of the material. 3 In Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, the
Court declared unconstitutional a law that required standardized
weights for bread loaves. 4
7 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).
8 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908).
9 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
lo See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559-62 (1923).
11 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926). "Shoddy" consisted of rags and other debris that were
used to stuff mattresses. Id. at 409.
12 Id. at 412-15.
13 Id. at 414.
14 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924).
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The consistent theme in all of these cases is that the Supreme
Court during the Lochner era was ruling in favor of businesses
and the wealthy at the expense of laws enacted to protect workers
and the less well off. Not surprisingly, Lochner era doctrines did
not survive the depression. The reality is that the market, far
more than government regulations, denied meaningful bargaining
power and economic liberty for most people in society. As Profes-
sor Tribe explains:
In large measure ... it was the economic realities of the Depres-
sion that graphically undermined Lochner's premises.... The
legal "freedom" of contract and property came increasingly to be
seen as an illusion, subject as it was to impersonal economic
forces. Positive government intervention came to be more
widely accepted as essential to individual, family, and commu-
nity survival, and legal doctrines would henceforth have to oper-
ate from that premise.15
This is not to deny that occasionally challenges to economic
regulations were brought by employees who wanted to work more
than sixty hours a week or for less than the minimum wage.
Rather, the point is that the overarching motif of the Lochner era
involved the Supreme Court striking down laws intended to help
workers and consumers, which in turn benefited corporations and
wealthy propertied interests. That is what claims of economic lib-
erties have always been about, even when the Court has ruled in
favor of the government. For example, in Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, the Court upheld a moratorium on foreclosure
sales of farm mortgages.16 The case involved an effort by banks to
invalidate a law that had been adopted during the depression to
protect consumers. Even today, economic liberties cases are about
efforts by those with money and property to resist government
regulation. The Supreme Court's most recent property rights
case-Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency-involved whether temporary delays in the de-
velopment of property for purposes of environmental review are a
per se taking. 7
"Economic liberties" has a clear and consistent meaning
throughout American history: efforts to use the Constitution to
protect the rights of corporations and property owners by invali-
dating laws enacted to protect employees, consumers, and the
environment.
15 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1358 (3d ed. 2000) (footnotes
omitted).
16 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934).
17 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002).
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III. RECONCEPTUALIZING ECONOMIC LIBERTIES TO
PROTECT THE POOR
Poverty is a serious problem in American society. 2000 Cen-
sus data indicated that 31.1 million people lived below the poverty
line; and an additional 12.3 million people were only slightly
above the poverty line."8 Whereas 9.4% of whites were below the
poverty line, 21.2% of Hispanics and 22% of blacks in the United
States are poor.' 9 Most tragically, eleven million children-one in
six children in the United States-lived in a family below the pov-
erty level.20 The problem is much greater for minority children.
Thirty percent of all black children and 27% of all Hispanic chil-
dren lived below the poverty level. 1
A decade of great economic prosperity did not benefit the poor
nearly as much as the rich; racial minorities continue to be vastly
less well off than whites. In 2000, white households had a median
net income of $44,232; black households had a median net income
of $30,436.2 According to recent census statistics, 38.7 million
people in the United States-14% of the population-went with-
out health insurance during the entire 2000 calendar year.2 Thir-
teen percent of whites were without health insurance, compared
to 18% of blacks. 4 In 1995, 39% of black households survived on
incomes of $11,612 or less, while only 6% of black households
brought in "high incomes" of $50,000 or more.25 Conversely, at the
close of the 1990s, the number of black household's earning under
$15,000 exceeded that of whites by more than 11%.26 As telling as
these statistics are, they do not convey the human effects of pov-
erty. Numbers cannot capture the devastating effects of poverty
or convey what it is like for a child to grow up hungry and without
access to medical care.
There is a serious problem with poverty in this country, but
there seems a general lack of awareness on the part of the public
to the plight of the poor. The poor are invisible to most Ameri-
cans. Popular images are shaped by television, yet few television
programs focus on the life of the poor in America. In most cities,
18 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 441 tbl.668 (122d ed. 2002).
19 Id.
20 Id. at tbl.669.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 433 tbl.653.
23 Id. at 102 tbl.137.
24 Id.
25 Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 751, 752 n.9 (1996) (citing MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHA-
PIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 100-01
(1995)).
26 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 433 tbl.652 (122d ed. 2002).
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the poor, and especially poor people of color, are physically segre-
gated from the rest of society. A big city dweller can coexist with
thousands of homeless people without ever seeing the poor where
they live. Even when the poor are physically visible, we make
them psychologically invisible. We have become accustomed to ig-
noring the homeless and stepping over and around street beggars.
None of the presidential candidates in 2000 advocated efforts
to deal with poverty in the United States. Over thirty years ago,
some in the Richard Nixon administration proclaimed that there
should be "benign neglect" of the problem of poverty.27 What has
occurred in recent decades is certainly neglect, but there has been
nothing benign about it. Decades have passed since the last new
program was created to help the poor. Instead, recent efforts have
focused on restricting eligibility and cutting benefits. The current
weak economy obviously will make the problem much worse.
IV. TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
MINIMUM ENTITLEMENTS
Persuading the public, and ultimately the Supreme Court,
that the government has a moral duty to provide every person
minimum subsistence will be difficult. Many deeply embedded so-
cial attitudes will need to be changed. A fundamental belief exists
in this society that people are responsible for themselves and their
own fate. Consequently, it is a widely accepted notion that, if peo-
ple are poor, it is a reflection of their own failings and that they
are responsible for a solution. In harmony with this commonly-
held misconception about the causes of poverty, welfare programs
traditionally have helped only the so-called "deserving poor:" de-
pendent children, the disabled, and the elderly. Others are
thought to have the responsibility for caring for themselves. Gen-
eral relief benefits traditionally have been unavailable in some
states and extremely limited in others.
But it is wrong to blame the poor for their financial plight.
People can become poor in countless ways that are no fault of their
own, and people often lack the means to do anything about it.
Many who are impoverished-most notably children-are truly
blameless. National economic policy, discrimination and its long
legacy, and inequalities in the educational system, are among the
social factors that limit the jobs available and relegate a signifi-
27 Jill Zuckman, Senate's Longtime Scholar, Champion of Change, Dies; N.Y
Shoeshine Boy Grew Up to Become 'An Intellectual Pioneer and a Trusted Advisor to the
Presidents,' CHI. TRm., Mar. 27, 2003, at C19, available at 2003 WL 17256554. Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a controversial democrat and congressional scholar, died March
26, 2003, as this essay was being completed. Surprisingly, he agreed to remain in the
White House as an advisor in the Nixon administration, where he infamously suggested
that government exercise "benign neglect" toward minorities. Id.
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cant proportion of the population to poverty. Regardless, though,
why people are poor, the government has a moral obligation to
care for those who are less well off. In a society with tremendous
wealth-enough to spend $100 billion on a war in Iraq-it is un-
conscionable that millions of children go to bed hungry and are
without health insurance.
Government actions can successfully provide people with
what is needed for subsistence. One of the worst, and most inac-
curate, lessons of the 1960s is that government poverty programs
cannot work. To the contrary, the programs of the 1960s were
quite successful in achieving their objectives. Between 1960 and
1969, the poverty rate declined from 22.2% to 12.1% of the
population.28
Perhaps more importantly, the general relief measures imple-
mented thus far have undeniably raised the quality of life for the
poor in America. Food stamps alleviate hunger for millions of peo-
ple; Medicare and Medicaid provide medical care to millions who
have none; and public housing programs, for all their problems,
provide shelter. Countless lives were improved because programs
provided people with basic necessities.
The real problem with anti-poverty efforts is that they have
always been terribly underfunded. During the 1960s, at the
height of social commitment to the war on poverty, another war-
the one in Vietnam-limited the scope of Great Society programs.
The effort to combat poverty was very much hindered by the mas-
sive amount of money that was needed to fund the war in South-
east Asia. As William L. O'Neill observed, "$1.6 billion, however
carefully expended, didn't go far toward meeting the needs of
thirty or forty million poor people.... [Tihe main problem was
always money. OEO [the Office of Economic Opportunity] had
$50 million to help 150,000 migrant workers, $32 million for over
200,000 reservation Indians."29
Unfortunately, history shows that voluntary efforts will not
provide adequate resources for the poor to ensure minimum sub-
sistence. The poor are truly a "discrete and insular minority."3
The poor possess little political power, and are obviously under-
represented in legislatures. By definition, they lack money to give
contributions to political candidates or to set up political action
28 Isabel V. Sawhill, Poverty in the United States: Why is it So Persistent?, 26 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1073, 1082 (1988).
29 WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE
1960's 131 (1971).
30 William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (1994).
See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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committees. They lack the resources to buy advertising time to
use the media to communicate.
Most importantly, the self-interest of the majority of citizens
is counter to the interests of the poor. Taxpayers are loath to give
up their hard earned money to support programs that will not di-
rectly benefit them. Social Security is a paradigm example. But
welfare programs are a low priority in the public's consciousness.
An ugly element of racism also explains the inadequacy of funding
for government programs. Deeply embedded racist attitudes cre-
ate stereotypes about welfare recipients, and these stereotypes be-
come a tacit basis for limiting programs and benefit levels.
All of this is to explain why it must be for the courts and the
Constitution to ensure protection of economic rights. The immedi-
ate response to this is that the Constitution is concerned only with
negative liberties, not affirmative rights. This is flawed for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is inaccurate to depict the Constitution as
solely a charter of negative liberties. Many parts of the Constitu-
tion create a duty on the part of the government to take affirma-
tive acts. The Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a
warrant before a search or an arrest except under relatively nar-
row circumstances." Almost the entire Fifth Amendment imposes
affirmative duties on the government, including the obligation to
convene a grand jury before trying a person for a crime and the
requirement that the government pay just compensation if it
takes private property for public use.3 2 The Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require notice and hear-
ing as part of procedural due process.3 The Sixth and Seventh
Amendments require the government to provide a jury in criminal
and civil trials, respectively. 4 The Sixth Amendment mandates
the provision of counsel in cases in which there is a possible prison
sentence. 5 Simply put, it is descriptively wrong to view the Con-
stitution as encompassing solely negative liberties.
Second, in the realm of minimum entitlements, the argument
based on negative liberties confuses rights and remedies. Most
constitutional rights can be phrased negatively, but remedies are
almost always phrased affirmatively. For example, a classic state-
ment of a negative right is that the Fourth Amendment generally
prohibits searches and seizures without warrants based on proba-
ble cause. The remedy, however, is an affirmative duty: the police
must seek warrants before searches or arrests. The Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits involuntary self-incrimination, a negative right.
31 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32 Id. amend. V.
33 Id. amends. V, XIV.
34 Id. amends. VI, VII.
35 Id. amend. VI.
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The Court has prescribed the affirmative duty of administering
Miranda warnings to give effect to the Fifth Amendment guaran-
tee. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregation; the courts
have mandated desegregation efforts as a remedy.
Similarly, the Court could and should find that the Constitu-
tion forbids the government from ignoring starvation and home-
lessness in that these are deprivations of life and liberty without
due process. These are negative liberties; prohibitions on what
the government may do. The remedies are affirmative: assuring
minimum entitlements.
Other scholars have developed arguments as to how the Con-
stitution can be interpreted to create rights to minimum entitle-
ments, and why it is desirable to understand the Constitution in
such a way. Frank Michelman argued that the Equal Protection
Clause should be interpreted to create such rights. 6 Alterna-
tively, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment might be construed to include a right to basic entitle-
ments. In fact, conservative scholar Philip Kurland suggested
this possibility in a law review article two decades ago.3 7 A privi-
lege guaranteed to all would be the essentials needed for life: food,
shelter, and medical care. In Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court
revived the Privileges or Immunities Clause and used it for the
first time in over a century to invalidate a state law that discrimi-
nated against new residents in a state in receiving welfare bene-
fits.38 The Court declared unconstitutional a California law which
provided that those moving into the state would have welfare ben-
efits set at the level of the state from which they moved.3 9
Another possibility is to use the Due Process Clause's protec-
tion of "life." The effect of government failure to provide minimum
subsistence is to deny individuals life without due process of law.
Even if people do not actually die from the lack of basic necessi-
ties, the adverse effects on the quality of life from hunger, home-
lessness, and a lack of medical care are sufficient to constitute a
deprivation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Basic
subsistence is the prerequisite for the exercise of all rights.
Another alternative is to emphasize international law, which
does create a right to minimum subsistence for all. Scholars, such
as Professor Nadine Strossen, have argued that the interpretation
of the American Constitution should be influenced by interna-
36 Michelman, supra note 6, at 11-12.
37 Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at
Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 419-20.
38 526 U.S. 489, 501-03, 510-11 (1999).
39 Id. at 493, 510-11.
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tional law norms.4" The United Nations' Universal Declaration of
Rights expressly declares in Article 25: "Everyone has the right to
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of him-
self and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medi-
cal care and necessary social services .... 1
My goal here, obviously, is not to develop these constitutional
arguments. Rather, I want to indicate what arguments might be
made. Nor is my objective to suggest that these arguments can be
developed in a way that would persuade the current Supreme
Court. Instead, my contention is that the Court should, at some
future time, find such constitutional rights. Critics are sure to ar-
gue that this is an inappropriate judicial role. The Court can de-
clare the right to minimum entitlements and leave the
legislatures with discretion as to how to assure provision of the
benefits. Legislatures might choose a guaranteed annual income
or a negative income tax. Alternatively, legislatures can choose
guaranteed employment with sufficient income, together with as-
sistance programs for those unable to work. Another possibility
would be a combination of cash programs and in-kind assistance,
such as food stamps and Medicaid. However the government
chooses to meet its responsibilities, the judicial role would be to
guaranty that the government has acted to assure every person of
basic essentials needed for life. The Court would declare the
rights and then leave to the legislature the choice as to how to
provide for them.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout American history, including in this symposium, it
is conservatives who argue for the protection of economic rights.
The Lochner era featured conservative Justices who were deeply
committed to a laissez-faire economy, protecting business from
legislative regulation. My objective in this essay is to offer an al-
ternative progressive vision: to see economic liberties as a way for
helping not the rich, but the poor. The rich have no problem pro-
tecting themselves in the political process. They can make cam-
paign donations and afford lobbyists and do all of the other things
incident to the influence of money on the political process. But the
poor obviously lack money to do these things. They are the ones
who need judicial protection.
40 Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual
Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
805 (1990).
41 UNIVERSAL DEcLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), reprinted in
BASIc DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (Ian Brownie ed., 2d ed. 1981).
42 Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-Eco-
nomic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137 (2003).
2003]
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In the wealthiest nation in the history of the planet, there
should not be starving children, or people without medical care, or
people without homes. I believe that someday in the distant fu-
ture, a more humane Supreme Court will find a constitutional
right for every person to have the minimum entitlements needed
for subsistence.
